There are several demands for new provinces in Pakistan, but the rationale behind them, as well as the opposition to them, is multifaceted. These include administrative, economic-development, and identity-based arguments, as well as concerns about implementation and costs.
Administratively, Pakistan’s large provinces are too big, as anyone who has taken the six-hour drive from Rajanpur or Rojhan to Lahore to complete a government form can testify. Economically, smaller administrative units do not get their share. Multan, Bahawalpur and Dera Ghazi Khan divisions of Punjab provide the country with much of its cotton, wheat and mangoes, but lag behind in development indicators.
Finally, some groups want separate provinces for cultural reasons. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was renamed in 2010, while residents of Hazara division, who speak Hindko, genuinely want it to become a separate province.
In Pakistan’s parliament, several serious proposals for new provinces have been made. One of them, South Punjab, appears closest to realisation, as it has the support of the country’s largest political parties. Southern Punjab, comprising 11 districts of the Multan, Bahawalpur and Dera Ghazi Khan divisions, has been proposed several times. The establishment of civil secretariats in Bahawalpur and Multan was a step towards that goal, but has been criticised as merely creating another secretariat without budgetary autonomy, as official documents still have to be approved in Lahore.
There is also a demand for a separate Hazara province. Hazara residents, whose cultural identity is different from that of the Pashtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, protested in 2010 when NWFP was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. They want a separate province with its capital at Abbottabad, covering five or seven districts of Hazara division. The federal parliament established a committee to address Hazara residents’ grievances, but the issue has since languished, even though the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly unanimously passed a resolution supporting a separate province.
Potohar, covering Rawalpindi division, is another region whose residents want a separate province. They cite their unique culture and economic underdevelopment as reasons for becoming a separate administrative unit. Meanwhile, the MQM-P has floated the contested idea of partitioning Sindh, either into Karachi and Hyderabad or Karachi and Lower Sindh. Its rationale was essentially administrative: Karachi, a sprawling metropolitan area of 20 million people, generates nearly 60% of Pakistan’s tax revenues and is in dire need of decentralisation. At present, Karachi is administered by several different provincial government departments.
Sindhi nationalists, however, believe that splitting Sindh would damage the province’s cultural heritage and have opposed the idea on the grounds of provincial integrity, arguing that Sindh has existed as a region long before Pakistan’s independence. Karachi’s administrative challenges are serious, but Sindhi nationalists’ fears are not irrational or out of context either.
The rationale behind most of these demands, with the exception of Hazara, essentially boils down to the fact that these are large administrative units distant from their capitals that contribute disproportionately to Pakistan’s economy without receiving much in return. However, even if all these demands were granted, they would hardly address Pakistan’s broader challenges of decentralising power.
In many ways, this debate is deceptive, as new provinces will not by themselves address Pakistan’s problems of decentralisation and inclusiveness. Constitutionally, a new province can only be formed with two-thirds majority in the relevant assemblies. This means that support in Punjab is necessary for a separate southern Punjab, an idea already endorsed by the Punjab Assembly along with the restoration of the former princely state of Bahawalpur as a province. Political dynasties in Punjab would not want to relinquish any district, as their political influence extends beyond the provincial capital. Thus, while all major parties have paid lip service to a South Punjab province, none has seriously supported it.
The constitutionally mandated consensus has so far proved extremely difficult to achieve in the pursuit of creating new provinces. Experts therefore argue that instead of focusing on new provinces, Pakistan should focus on its third tier of government, local affairs departments, which are currently under-resourced and insufficiently empowered. New provinces would create more chief ministers, governors, secretariats and high courts without necessarily decentralising Pakistan’s political and fiscal systems. Empowering local governments is key to addressing the sense of distance and disenfranchisement felt by residents of far-away districts.
The 18th Amendment already recognises the importance of local governments by making them directly elected and mandating their existence in every province. The challenge has been implementation. Local government systems, which are supposed to operate under provincial supervision, have remained weak and semi-autonomous. Municipal committees in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar have been unable to exercise real authority, as most development and administrative powers belong to provincial governments. Revenue from local taxes and levies belongs to local governments, but the distribution of development budgets usually rests with members of the provincial or national assemblies rather than local authorities. Unless the local government system is strengthened, creating new provinces will not lead to meaningful change.
The ideal system would give districts many of the powers currently exercised by provinces. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s local government system, with its three-tier structure of village/neighbourhood, tehsil and district councils, is in some ways an example for Pakistan’s other provinces to follow.
The main issue with local government systems across Pakistan is funding. The Provincial Finance Commission Award, which determines how much money a district receives from the provincial budget, needs to have the same status as the National Finance Commission Award, which apportions revenues from the Centre to the provinces. Allocating 30-40 per cent of a provincial budget to local governments for education, health, sanitation and roads would have a far greater impact on Pakistan’s local government system.
The challenges of distance and disenfranchisement are real, but Pakistan’s experience with local government suggests that new provinces would have only a limited impact. Local government elections, if held regularly and on a fixed schedule mandated by the constitution, would create direct accountability between representatives and residents of a locality, district or city. Local governments can address day-to-day governance problems that new provinces would have little impact on.
At the same time, new provinces would address concerns about political representation in southern Punjab and among the 50 million Seraikis, as well as the administrative challenges in Karachi. New provinces and stronger local authorities therefore tackle different issues, but together they could solve many of Pakistan’s governance problems.
New provinces are justified because, compared to countries such as India, Pakistan has too few provinces for its population size. The US, for instance, has 50 states for 340 million people, compared to Pakistan’s four provinces for 250 million. At the same time, Pakistan’s federal system has too many layers, while its administrative system dates back to the colonial era. The Fata merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is instructive in this regard.
The 25th Amendment, which merged Fata with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, had support across the political spectrum, as everyone recognised the urgent need to end discrimination against Fata residents and provide security and stability to the settled areas. It also had a comprehensive implementation strategy: a constitutional safeguard for the merger, a 10-year development plan and substantial financial resources. The Fata merger serves as a reminder that the concerns of people in Hazara, southern Punjab, Potohar, Karachi and Sindh can be addressed in ways that bring lasting prosperity and stability to these areas.
A comprehensive strategy would entail several steps. First and foremost, there should be an independent body, perhaps a National Committee on Provinces and Federal Reforms under the auspices of the National Assembly and Senate, to determine criteria for the creation of new provinces. This would depoliticise the process and help it gain wider public support. The committee could also propose a timeframe for implementing local-level reforms, as well as an action plan for provinces seeking to split. The least contentious proposals, namely the division of Punjab into South Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa into Hazara, should be examined more closely as pilot projects.
Finally, any constitutional amendments creating new provinces in Pakistan should be tied to a mandate to hold local government elections in accordance with the 18th Amendment as soon as possible and on a regular basis. Stronger local authorities can address many of the challenges that new provinces alone will not solve. The two reforms should therefore be seen not as competing alternatives but as complementary parts of a broader effort to make Pakistan’s system of government more representative, accessible and effective.
