Perhaps nothing illustrates the Taliban’s lack of readiness to assume power, and the swiftness with which they actually did so, than their failure so far to form a government. Their own surprise at winning the war shows the most in this, and indicates that the Taliban’s own intelligence may well have been more in line with American intelligence, in predicting the survival of the Ghani regime for some months, than with the reality of the brisk collapse.
The delay in naming the head of a government has already led to the unusual phenomenon of having head appointed of some, but not all, essential ministries, such as interior, defence and finance. The appointments are supposed to be temporary, which is only right, as the incoming head of government would want to appoint his own nominees to these posts.
However, the situation remains fragile, even more than if a new ruler were to try to consolidate his hold. Nature abhors a vacuum, they say, and the failure to even name the head of government could lead to future problems.
The delay itself shows not only that there was not enough time for a decision, but there is some great dispute going on. The two main contenders are Haibatullah Akhundzada and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, and they seem to summarize the conflict of forming governments in party-based systems.
It must be made clear that the Taliban’s Emirate is party-based, though not democratic. As in 1996, so in 2021: the Taliban have not won an election. In 1996, they beat off warlords and militia commanders; in 2021 it was the USA as well as the Afghan National Army. On neither occasion did they even bother with a fig leaf of constitutionalism. Indeed, in 1996, there was no constitution. This time, there is a constitution placed, but there have been only two gestures towards it. First, incumbent Ashraf Ghani has not resigned, thus retaining experience, though some sort of lien on the office. Second, one of his vice-presidents, Amrullah Saleh, has claimed to be the acting president, now that Ghani has left the country. Saleh has not, joining the son of Ahmad Shah Masoud, his namesake in the Panjshir Valley, where he hopes to launch a resistance.
Normally, the head of the party becomes head of government when the party takes power. That was what the Taliban did in 1996: they made the party chief, the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, the head of government. By that precedent, Akhundzada should have been installed by now. However, that has not happened for two reasons. Akhundzada was elected in 2016 after his predecessor Mullah Akhtar Mansour was killed in a drone strike. He had only taken office less than a year before, in 2015. Akhundzada was not expected to last long, but the only assassination attempt he faced as Taliban chief, in 2019, came from a Taliban splinter, not a US drone strike.
Interestingly, he does not have any combat experience, which may be proving a barrier at present. The other possibility, Baradar, does have such experience, including the recently successful offensive. He was also the chief Taliban negotiator in Doha, a position he was given after spending several years in Pakistani captivity. His being Mullah Omar’s brother-in-law also counts in his favour.
